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Advertisement, Media Bias, Political Polarisation

By Sonal Chandra
When consumers value cognitive consistency between the news they read and
policies they support, politicians are induced to make policies that conform to
a polarized media landscape which not only depends on user subscription for
revenue but also advertisement receipts. Following Guo et. al. (2018), I develop a model to study how the dependency on advertisement revenue affects
media bias, political polarisation, and voter preferences. I show that though
the equilibrium prices of the two newspapers fall when they depend on advertising receipts, the difference between the equilibrium prices and thus ideological position of a marginal voter remains unchanged, compared to Guo
et. Al. (2018). Moreover, the extents of political and media polarisation do
not depend on newspapers’ dependence on advertisement receipts. I also find
that when political parties are not ideologically driven and newspapers have a
stronger preference for editorial neutrality, then increase in the public’s trust
on the newspapers for news consumption leads to increased media and political
polarisation.
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Introduction

Media, especially news channels, play a substantial role in shaping people’s
opinion about the society in which they live in. News channels also play a
crucial role in democracies by holding the state accountable for its actions and
raising the concerns of the citizens to the state. Consequently, media is also
known as the fourth pillar of a democracy.
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In that case, it is the paramount responsibility of news outlets to do unbiased
reporting of news and facts. However, there is ample evidence in the literature to evince that media, in most countries, are highly biased. For instance,
Groseclose and Milyo (2005) found evidence suggesting that US news channels
are biased towards left of the centre. There is, however, no consensus on the
direction of the media bias. Goldberg (2002) and Coulter (2003) argue that
the bias is in favour of the left, while Alterman (2003) and Franken (2003) argue that the bias is in favour of the right. Apart from the direction of bias,
the origin of media bias is also not unanimously accepted in the current literature. In principle, media bias can originate from the supply side, and reflect
the preferences of journalists (Baron, 2004), editors, and owners (Besley and
Prat, 2004; Djankov et al., 2003). It can also originate from the demand side,
and reflect the news providers’ profit-maximising motive to cater to the demand of the consumers (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). Nevertheless, media bias has far reaching consequences, especially in democracies. A biased
media landscape may even influence policies designed by the political parties.
A party’s policies can be influenced by media firms whose ideological orientation is closer to it (Chan and Suen, 2008). Therefore, in this research project
I attempt to explore the different factors that lead to media bias and political
polarisation.

Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) studied the decision to slant news contents
when consumers value cognitive consistency. Guo et.al. (2018) further expanded Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)’s work by combining Downs (1957)’s
and d’Aspremont et.al.(1979)’s models. Their model captures the behaviour of
political parties, media firms, voters, but ignores the influence of dependence
of media firms on advertisement revenue. Chan and Suen (2008) and Gab-
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szewicz et.al. (2001) take into account advertisement revenue but they leave
out how such polarisation affects voter preferences. Therefore, I would examine how news channels’ dependency on advertisement revenue affects media
bias, political polarisation, and voter preferences.

The main focus of this study is to examine the effects of dependency on advertisement revenue on media bias, political polarisation, and voter preferences. I would add advertisement revenue to the model of Guo et.al. (2018) to
see if this addition makes any modifications in the equilibrium values of their
model. I am choosing the model of Guo et.al. (2018) as I find it the most
comprehensive model that explains the interaction among media bias, political
polarisation, and voter preferences. The authors make the duopoly assumption in the spirit of Hotelling (1929). Adding another player (advertisers) to
their model would help make the model more comprehensive and would result
in a 4-Stage game. At Stage 1, political parties and newspapers simultaneously choose their ideological position on a left-right political spectrum. At
Stage 2, newspapers simultaneously set the prices they would charge to their
customers. At Stage 3, newspapers simultaneously set the tariffs they would
charge to the advertisers. Finally, at Stage 4, voters consume news and make
their voting decisions.

Analysing the role advertisement receipts play on media bias and political
polarisation is crucial. It could help us rethink about the extent to which
commercialisation has affected the news channels and politics, especially in
large democracies. Such analysis can also help in designing policies regarding
whether advertisements should be the prime revenue source of newspapers.
If yes, then are there ways to reduce media bias and political polarisation
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while newspapers heavily depend on advertisement receipts? Moreover, such
an analysis can be further expanded to capture more real world scenarios such
as inclusion of multi-party electoral systems, autocratic systems, etc.
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Literature Review

Economists have tried to model media polarisation and political bias for past
several decades. Each model identifies one or many factors that drive(s) media polarisation. For instance, Guo et.al (2018) argue that it is the consumers
need for cognitive consistency between the news they read and the policies
they support that induces politicians to propose polarised policies which conform to a polarised media landscape. The theoretical foundations of the present
models of media bias and political polarisation largely come from model’s
like Hotelling (1927) and d’Aspremont et.al. (1979). Hotelling’s model concludes that firms in a duopoly that are selling identical commodities and are
facing linear transportation costs, inevitably converge to the centre (to maximise the number of customers) and minimal product differentiation happens. d’Aspremont et.al. (1979), however, challenged the linear transportation
cost assumption of Hotelling’s model. They assumed transportation costs are
quadratic with respect to distance. Consequently, d’Aspremont et.al (1979)
reach to the conclusion that both sellers in a duopoly have a tendency to
maximise their differentiation, thus countering Hotelling’s conclusion. Brenner
(2005) also further expanded Hotelling’s model by relaxing the duopoly assumption. He argued that with quadratic transportation costs, when the number of firms is greater than 2, firms neither maximise nor minimise differentiation. Increasing the number of firms, however, is advantageous for the firms at
the corner (Brenner, 2005). Hence, hinting towards the fact that biased media
may have an economic advantage over unbiased or centrist media platforms.
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In a major contribution to the field of political economy, Downs (1957) argues
that tendency of political parties in a two-party system to resemble each other
and converge their policies to the median voter can be explained as efficient
reactions to imperfect information in a large democracy. Downs (1957) argues
that we live in a world where all agents (consumers and governments) have
imperfect information about each other and the cost of obtaining information
to be perfectly knowledgeable far outweighs the benefits from such information as the probability of one perfectly informed vote determining the election
outcome is statistically zero. So, individuals have incentive to let persuaders
(like news channels) to bridge the information gap. Persuaders, however, can
report facts in a biased manner to suit the political group they support in
exchange of policy favours. So, Downs (1957) provides key insights into the
interaction between media and politics. But Downs (1957) does not explore
the importance of ownership or source of revenue of these Persuaders. Guo
et. al (2018) combined the approach of d’Aspremont et.al (1979) and Downs
(1957) to conclude that minimal product differentiation and maximal product
differentiation are only two special cases in case of media and political polarisation. When media firms are operating in a society where politics does not
matter, then maximal product differentiation effectively softens competition
and maximises profit (Guo et.al., 2018). When political parties are not ideologically driven and their main goal is to win elections, then political policies
converge to the median voter, thus no political polarisation (Guo et.al., 2018).
But in a world where political parties and media firms coexist, and political
parties are not only ideologically motivated but also driven by office-motives,
equilibrium ideological positions adopted by media firms and political parties are less extreme. The equilibrium ideological position of the two media

5

firms would be more extreme than that of the two political parties, though
(Guo et.al., 2018). In their model, however, they assume that the only source
of revenue the two media firms have is consumer subscription. This assumption may not necessarily be true in the real world. Media firms are heavily
dependent on advertisements and derive virtually no revenue from viewers
and listeners (Chan and Suen, 2008). Chan and Suen (2008) also argue that
in a duopoly when media firms are commercially driven, the two media firms
converge to a moderate ideological position in the equilibrium. Gabszewicz
et.al. (2001) also support this conclusion of Chan and Suen (2008). They argue that as the newspaper industry depends on the possibility of financing
an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts, the editors of
the newspapers moderate the political message they convey to their readers.
Gabszewicz et.al. (2001) mentions that when media firms depend on advertising revenue, the editors tend to present a similar centrist image to their
readers. The intuition behind this result is that the editors have to sell centrist and tasteless political messages to their readers in order to sell a larger
audience to their advertisers (Gabszewicz et.al., 2001). But this is contrary to
Chan and Suen (2008)’s and other previously mentioned authors’ claims that
media is heavily dependent on advertisement receipts and is highly polarised.

Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) consider another major force that could
guide media bias: reader diversity. They argue that when people value cognitive consistency, then a polarised political and media landscape may result
in a more accurate picture being presented to the conscientious reader. They
also find that competition among newspapers increases media bias. Greater
competition among newspapers forces them to aggressively cater to the prejudices of their readers as competitors strive to divide the market (Mullainathan
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and Shleifer, 2005). Hence, making news contents more biased.

3

Model

My model assumes that there are n (n > 0) people living in the society, two
political parties (indexed by i = r, l ), and two newspaper firms (indexed by j
= 1, 2). The assumptions related to political parties and newspapers are similar to that of Guo et.al. (2018). Each political party chooses a policy position
such that αr ∈ [0, 1] and αl ∈ [-1, 0], and each of the newspapers advocate a
policy position such that β1 ∈ [0, 1] and β2 ∈ [-1, 0]. Like Guo et.al. (2018), I
follow the duopoly assumption as it provides the simplest oligopoly framework
which incorporates locations, prices, and strategic interactions. A fraction q
of the population chooses a newspaper for news consumption and vote for a
political party based on the policy positions advocated by their chosen newspaper and political party. Hence, for a citizen with ideological position x, the
utility from voting for party i and getting news from media outlet j is:

U (i, j, x) = u − a(αi − x)2 − b(βj − x)2 − c(αi − βj )2 − pj

i = r, l and j = 1, 2

where pj is the price charged by newspaper j. The term −a(αi − x)2 shows the
dis-utility from voting for parties that have ideological position far from one’s
own ideological position. The term −b(βj − x)2 shows the dis-utility from subscribing to newspapers that advocate ideological positions that are far from
one’s own ideological position. The term −c(αi − βj )2 shows the dis-utility
when there is a difference between the ideological positions of the newspaper
one subscribed to and the political party one voted for. This term captures

7

the demand for cognitive consistency. Parameters a, b, and c are all positive
real numbers and x is uniformly distributed on [-1, 1].

(1-q) of the population does not watch news and Z represents the fraction
of (1-q) who will vote for part r. Z is uniformly distributed over 0 and 1. So,
Party r wins if:

q.P r(chooses party r) + (1 − q)Z ≥ 1/2.

So,
P r(r wins) = 1/2 + q(P r(chooses party r) − 1/2)/(1 − q).
To ensure that the above probability is within 0 and 1, Guo et.al. (2018) assumes q ≤ 1/2. Now, let δ and ρ represent the degree of how ideologically
driven a party is and the degree of motivation a party has for winning the office, respectively. If Party r wins, then it obtains an office rent of ρ − δ(αr −
1)2 . Note that the office rent reaches its maximum when αr = 1. This reflects
the assumption that party r has policy preferences in addition to pure office
winning motive. Party r chooses αr to maximize
Φr = P r(r wins)(ρ − δ(αr − 1)2 ).

Similarly, party l chooses αl to maximize
Φl = P r(l wins)(ρ − δ(αr + 1)2 ).

Newspapers have two main sources of revenue: user subscription and advertisement receipts. So, they also sell ad insets to advertising agencies at prices
si , i = 1, 2. I will incorporate advertising agencies to my model according to
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Gabszcewicz et.al.(2001). An advertiser is represented by a parameter θ where
θ ∈ [0,1], which expresses the intensity of the advertisers’ preferences for buying an inset in a newspaper. Gabszcewicz et.al.(2001) also assumes that the
density of advertisers’ population of type θ is constant and is equal to 4k.
Furthermore, according to Gabszcewicz et.al.(2001), Di and Ri represent the
demand function for advertising insets in newspaper i:

Di (s1 , s2 ) = 4k.(1 − si /(n.q.P r(chooses newspaper i))) ; i = 1, 2

Ri (s1 , s2 ) = 4k.(1 − si /(n.q.P r(chooses newspaper i))).si ; i = 1, 2.

Gabszcewicz et.al.(2001) derives the equilibrium tariff charged by newspapers
to the advertising agencies to be s∗i = (n.q.P r(chooses newspaper i))/2 resulting to the equilibrium receipts

Ri (s∗1 , s∗2 ) = k(n.q.P r(chooses newspaper i)).

Moreover, the newspapers have ideal policy positions equal to that of the median voter (x = 0): as suggested by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) one can
interpret the ideological position of x = 0 as unbiased reporting. They suffer
dis-utility when they drift away from the ideal position. But apart from ideology, newspapers are also profit maximising institutions. I assume that newspapers have two main sources of revenue: user subscription and advertisement
receipts. Newspaper j wants to maximize:

Πj = (n.q.P r(chooses newspaper i)).[(pj + k) − c0 ] − t.βj2 ; j = 1, 2
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where k refers to the unit receipt originating from advertising sales, pj is price
of newspaper j, and c’ is the cost of producing newspaper j. For simplicity, I
assume that both the newspaper firms experience the same costs of production.

4

Benchmarks
• Politics-only case : Guo et. al. (2018) discusses a ’politics-only’ case
in which b = c = 0. An indifferent citizen’s ideological position is represented by xP = (αr + αl )/2. Since, x is uniformly distributed over [-1,1],
Pr[Chooses Party r] = (1 − xp )/2. This results in the following objective
function for party r:
q
(αr + αl )
1
ΦP
)(ρ − δ(αr − 1)2 ).
r =( −
2 (1 − q)
4
In a symmetric equilibrium αr = −αl ≡ αP , so the first-order condition
reduces to:
∂ΦP
−q
r
=
[(ρ − αp )2 ] + δ(1 − αP ) ≤ 0.
∂αr
4(1 − q)
Solving for αP , Guo et.al.(2018), states that there exists a δ ∗ such that
if δ ≤ δ ∗ then αP = 0, otherwise αP ∈ (0, 1). An important takeaway from this result is that if there are no commercial media and the
political parties are not ideologically driven (δ ≤ δ ∗ ), then they tend to
make less extreme policies. Hence, political polarisation is reduced.
• Media-only case : Guo et. al. (2018) discusses another special case
in which a = c = 0. An indifferent citizen’s ideological position is represented by xM =

b(β12 −β22 )+(p1 −p2 )
.
2b(β1 −β2 )
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Guo et. al. (2018) assumes full

price coverage which results in newspaper 1’s readership fraction to be
q(1 − xM )/2. In this case, Guo et. al. (2018) obtains β M = 1 for a symmetric equilibrium, where β1 = −β2 ≡ β M .

5

Equilibrium Locations for Newspapers and
Political Parties

In this model I have assumed that a voter who supports Party r will get news
from right leaning newspaper 1, and a voter who supports Party l will get
news from left leaning newspaper 2. Let x̂ represent the voter who is indifferent between (r,1) and (l,2) at stage 4 of the game. Solving for U (r, 1, x̂) =
U (l, 2, x̂) gives:

x̂(p1 , p2 ) =

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) + (b + c)(β12 − β22 ) − 2c(αr β1 − αl β2 ) + (p1 − p2 )
.
2(a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )
(1)

Since x is uniformly distributed on [-1, 1], the probability that a voter chooses
to get news from newspaper 1 is equal to (1 − x̂)/2. Given this demand function, newspaper 1 chooses p1 , to maximize π1 in stage 2:

π1 (p1 , p2 ) =

n.q.(1 − x̂)
[p1 + k − c0 ] − tβ12 .
2

(2)

Similarly, newspaper 2 chooses p2 to maximize π2 :

π2 (p1 , p2 ) =

n.q.(1 + x̂)
[p2 + k − c0 ] − tβ22 .
2

At Nash equilibrium, we want
∂π1
∂π2
=
= 0.
∂p1
∂p2
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(3)

This implies:
(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 )
2
(b + c)(β12 − β22 )
p2 − k + c0
+
− c(αr β1 − αl β2 ) +
2
2

p1 = [a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 ) −

(4)

and
(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 )
2
(b + c)(β12 − β22 )
p 1 − k + c0
+
− c(αr β1 − αl β2 ) +
. (5)
2
2

p2 = [a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 ) +

Solving for p1 and p2 in (3) and (4) I get:

pˆ2 = 2[a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )] +

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) (b + c)(β12 − β22 )
+
3
3
2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
−
+ c0 − k
3

(6)

and

pˆ1 = 2[a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )] −

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) (b + c)(β12 − β22 )
+
3
3
2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
−
+ c0 − k.
3

(7)

Note that the equilibrium p̂s of my model are equal to the equilibrium p̂s +
k − c0 of Guo et.al. (2018)’s model. Also, if we assume that k is greater than
c’, then the equilibrium prices are lower than that of Guo et.al. (2018)’s model.
This implies that when newspapers’ sources of revenue are advertisement receipts along with user subscription, then the equilibrium prices of the newspa0 Derivations

of equations (6),(7), and (8) are included in the Appendix
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pers should be lower than otherwise. This makes intuitive sense because when
newspapers derive revenue from selling ad insets, they can afford to charge
lower prices to their readers and still make profit.

From equations (6) and (7), we can calculate the equilibrium price differential
as such:

pˆ1 − pˆ2 =

−2(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) + (b + c)(β12 − β22 ) − 2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
.
3

(8)

From equations (1) and (8), we know that x̂ increases over (p1 − p2 ) which remains unchanged when advertisement receipts are added to Guo et.al. (2018)’s
model. This shows that newspapers’ dependency on advertisement receipts do
not affect the equilibrium ideological position of the voters. Substituting the
values of (pˆ1 − pˆ2 ) into equation (2), we have:

x̃ = x̂(pˆ1 , pˆ2 ) =

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) + (b + c)(β12 − β22 ) − 2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
.
6[a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )]

Now, we can express the reduced form of newspaper 1’s payoff function as:

Π1 =

2[a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )].n.q.(1 − x̃)2
− tβ12
2

which is equivalent to that of Guo et.al. (2018)’s model. So, the numerical
calculation for the derivation of β ∗ would be identical to that of Guo et.al.(2018)
and
)
q(3b + 2cα∗ )
β = min
,1
2q(b + c) + 6t
(

∗

(9)

where β ∗ = β1 = −β2 and α∗ = αr = −αl .
So, the addition of revenue from advertisement receipts to the model does not
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affect the equilibrium ideological positions of the newspaper firms. Now consider Party r’s decision of αr , that is facing the following objective function:

Φr =


1
q
x̃
−
)(ρ − δ(αr − 1)2 .
2 (1 − q) 2

In a symmetric solution, the first-order condition for Party r is given by:
q
(a + c)α∗ − cβ ∗
∂Φr
= δ(1 − α∗ ) −
((ρ − α∗ )2 )
= 0.
∂αr
2(1 − q)
6(aα∗ + bβ ∗ )

(10)

Guo et.al (2018) shows the existence of a solution for equations (9) and (10).
Moreover, as I mentioned earlier the value for β ∗ in my model and in Guo
et.al (2018)’s model are the same. As the value of α∗ is a function of β ∗ among
other parameters, it will be identical as well. So, my model extends Guo et.al
(2018)’s model by showing that even when newspaper firms are dependent on
advertisement revenues along with user subscription, the degree of political
polarisation is the same as it is when user subscription is the only source of
revenue for newspaper firms.

Proposition 1 of Guo et.al (2018) states that a unique solution to equations
(13) and (14) exist. Moreover, in a symmetric solution,

0 ≤ αP < α∗ < β ∗ ≤ β M = 1.

α∗ > αP implies that the presence of commercial media tends to pull the
political parties toward more extreme policy positions (Guo et.al, 2018). I
have shown that even when newspapers depend on advertisement receipts
the degree of media and political polarisation remains unchanged. In other
words, the values of α∗ and β ∗ remain unchanged. So proposition 1 of Guo
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et.al (2018)’s model holds true for this model as well.

6

Comparative Statics

In this section I will analyze the effect of change in the degree to which newspapers value editorial neutrality (t) on the equilibrium ideological positions
of the political parties and the media firms. I would also analyse the effect
of change in the fraction of the population that depends on newspapers for
news consumption (q) on the equilibrium ideological positions of the newspapers and the political parties. Guo et.al (2018) derive the symmetric equilibrium ideological positions for political parties when δr = δl = 0 to be:

β1∗ =

3(a + c)qb
,
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]

(11)

αr∗ =

3cqb
.
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]

(12)

Taking the derivative of equation 11 with respect to t gives us the following
equation:
3
1
∂β1∗
= − (a + c)qb
3(a + c)
∂t
2
[q(ab + ac + bc) + 3t(a + c)]2

=

−9(a + c)2 qb
.
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]2

Since q ≥ 0, a, b, c ∈R+ , and t ∈ [0, qb/6], therefore, for all t,

∂β1∗
∂t

< 0.

So, when δr = δl = 0, increase in t reduces β1∗ . In other words, when political party r is purely motivated by winning elections and is completely nonpartisan in nature, then as newspapers face more dis-utility for deviating from
median voter’s ideological position, its equilibrium ideological stance becomes
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more neutral. In fact, since we have a symmetric equilibrium,

β2∗ =

−3(a + c)qb
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]

and
∂β2∗
3
1
3(a + c)
= (a + c)qb
∂t
2
[q(ab + ac + bc) + 3t(a + c)]2

=

9(a + c)2 qb
> 0.
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]2

Therefore, β2 increases with t. The signs of the first order derivatives of β1∗
and β2∗ with respect to t lead to an intuitive conclusion that media polarisation is negatively related to the degree to which newspapers value editorial
neutrality (t)

Now let’s turn to α∗ . Taking the derivative of equation (12) with respect to
t gives us the following equation:
∂αr∗
3
1
= − cqb
3(a + c)
∂t
2
[q(ab + ac + bc) + 3t(a + c)]2

=

−9(a + c)cqb
.
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]2

Therefore, for all t ∈ [0, qb/6],

∂α∗
r
∂t

< 0. So, when δr = δl = 0, αr∗ falls with

t. In other words, when party r is purely motivated by winning elections, increase in preference of newspapers to adhere to neutrality makes party r support less extreme policies as well. Similar to the analysis of β1∗ , because of the
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symmetric nature of the equilibrium,

αl∗ =

−3cqb
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]

and
∂αl∗
3
1
3(a + c)
= cqb
∂t
2
[q(ab + ac + bc) + 3t(a + c)]2

=

9(a + c)cqb
> 0.
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]2

Therefore, αl increases with t. The signs of the first order derivatives of αr∗
and αl∗ with respect to t lead me to my first proposition.

Proposition 1: Political polarisation is negatively related to the degree to
which newspapers value editorial neutrality (t).

In fact, proposition 1 also implies that if newspapers adhere to neutrality so
will the political parties.

Apart from media firms’ adherence to neutrality, the trust that people place
on newspapers can also determine the ideological positions of newspapers and
political parties. I operationalize this trust factor using the variable q which
represents the fraction of the population that depends on the two newspapers
in my model for news consumption. Taking the derivative of equation (11)
with respect to q gives us the following equation:
∂β1∗
3(a + c)b[q(ab + c(a + b)) + 3t(a + c)] − 3(a + c)qb(ab + c(a + b))
=
∂q
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]2
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Proposition 2: If t > 0 then

∂β1∗
∂q

> 0 and if t = 0 then

∂β1∗
∂q

= 0.

Proposition 2 implies that when political parties are not ideologically motivated (i.e. δr = δl = 0 ) and newspapers face dis-utility for not being neutral
(i.e. t > 0), then increase in the fraction of the population consuming news
from newspapers increases media polarisation. Whereas, if newspapers do not
face dis-utility for not being neutral (i.e. t = 0), then increase in the fraction
of the population consuming news from newspapers does not affect media polarisation.

Moreover, taking the derivative of equation 12 with respect to q gives us the
following result:
∂αr∗
3bc[q(ab + c(a + b)) + 3t(a + c)] − 3cqb(ab + c(a + b))
=
∂q
2[q(ab + c(a + b) + 3t(a + c)]2
Proposition 3: If t > 0 then

∂α∗
r
∂q

> 0 and if t = 0 then

∂α∗
r
∂q

= 0.

In other words, when political when political parties are not ideologically motivated (i.e. δr = δl = 0 ) and newspapers face dis-utility for not being neutral (i.e. t > 0), then increase in the fraction of the population consuming
news from newspapers increases political polarisation. Whereas, if newspapers
do not face dis-utility for not being neutral (i.e. t = 0), then increase in the
fraction of the population consuming news from newspapers does not affect
political polarisation.

18

7

Conclusion

Following Guo et. al. (2018)’s and Gabszcewicz et.al.(2001)’s models I have
shown that when newspaper firms depend on advertisement receipts political and media polarisation happen and the extent of the polarisation is the
same as when the newspaper firms do not depend on advertisement revenue.
The analysis also shows that the equilibrium prices of the two newspapers fall
when they depend on advertising receipts. However, the difference between
the equilibrium prices do not change as compared to Guo et. al. (2018)’s
model. Since, the equilibrium ideological position of a marginal voter is a
function of the price difference, it remains unchanged as well. So, I have shown
that the conclusions made by the model of Guo et.al. (2018) are robust to
newspapers depending on advertisement revenue. Moreover, my analysis also
shows that when political parties are not ideologically driven and newspapers
have a stronger preference for editorial neutrality, then increase in the public’s
trust on the newspapers for news consumption leads to increased media bias
and political polarisation
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Appendix

Derivation of equilibrium prices (pˆ1 and pˆ2 )

We know that

x̂(p1 , p2 ) =

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) + (b + c)(β12 − β22 ) − 2c(αr β1 − αl β2 ) + (p1 − p2 )
2(a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )

Let
N 0 = (a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) + (b + c)(β12 − β22 ) − 2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
and
N = N 0 + p1 − p2
Let
D = 2(a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )
From equations (3) and (4) we have:

π1 (p1 , p2 ) =

n.q.(1 − x̂)
[p1 + k − c0 ] − tβ12
2

π2 (p1 , p2 ) =

n.q.(1 + x̂)
[p2 + k − c0 ] − tβ22
2

and

21

So,


∂π1
n.q n.q N
p 1 + k − c0
=
−
+
=0
∂p1
2
2 D
D
as
∂ x̂
= 1/D
∂p1
Now,
N
p1 + k − c0
−
=0
D
D
N 0 + p1 − p2
p1 + k − c0
1−
−
=0
D
D
1−

D − N 0 − p1 + p2 − p1 − k − c0 = 0

Therefore,

p1 =

D − N 0 +0 p2 − k + c0
2

Moreover,


∂π2
n.q n.q N
p 2 + k − c0
=
+
−
=0
∂p2
2
2 D
D
as
∂ x̂
= 1/D
∂p2
Now,
p2 + k − c0
N
−
=0
D
D
p2 + k − c0
N 0 + p1 − p2
1−
−
=0
D
D
1−

D + N 0 + p1 − p2 − p2 − k + c0 = 0
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(A1)

Therefore,

p2 =

D + N 0 +0 p1 − k + c0
2

(A2)

By (A1) and (A2) we have:
D − N 0 + p2 − k + c0
c0 − k
D + N0
+
+
= pˆ2
2
4
2
0
0
0
0
2(D + N ) D − N
c − k 2(c − k)
3pˆ2
+
+
+
=
4
4
4
4
4
3D + N 0 + 3c0 − 3k = 3pˆ2

Therefore,

pˆ2 = D +

N0
+ c0 − k
3

(A3)

This implies,

pˆ2 = 2[a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )] +

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) (b + c)(β12 − β22 )
+
3
3
2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
+ c0 − k
−
3

By (A1) and (A3) we have:
D − N0
D N0
c0 − k c0 − k
+
+
+
+
= pˆ1
2
2
6
2
2
3N 0
N0
D−
+
+ (c0 − k) = pˆ1
6
6
N0
+ (c0 − k) = pˆ1
D−
3
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This implies,

pˆ1 = 2[a(αr − αl ) + b(β1 − β2 )] −

(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) (b + c)(β12 − β22 )
+
3
3
2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
−
+ c0 − k
3

Hence,


−2N 0
(a + c)(αr2 − αl2 ) + (b + c)(β12 − β22 ) − 2c(αr β1 − αl β2 )
pˆ1 − pˆ2 =
= −2
3
3

24

